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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-LUGGAGE FOUND DURING A LAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE MAY NOT BE SEARCHED WITHOUT A WAR-

RANT-Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
In Arkansas v. Sanders,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that in the absence of exigent circumstances, police must obtain a warrant before
searching luggage taken from an automobile lawfully stopped and
searched for contraband. The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell,
sharply restricts further extension of the "automobile exception" 2 to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. The Court found the exception inapplicable for two reasons. First, a suitcase in the custody of
police lacks the inherent mobility of an automobile. 3 Second, there is a
much greater expectation of privacy associated with luggage than is associated with a car.4 A caustic dissent5 by Justice Blackman joined by Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority's decision creates an impracticable and confusing rule that makes little sense in terms of fourth
amendment policy. 6 This note will examine the interaction in Arkansas v.
Sanders of the legitimate expectation of privacy doctrine, 7 the "automobile exception,' '8 and the exigent circumstances exception. 9 The note will
conclude that despite the ambiguity of the majority's method of determining when a container gives rise to legitimate expectation of privacy, Sanders is a reaffirmation of fourth amendment rights which had been threatened by the ever-increasing number of exceptions to the warrant clause.
I.

THE FACTUAL SETTING OF SANDERS

Following a reliable' 0 informant's tip, Arkansas police placed the Little Rock Municipal airport under surveillance and awaited the arrival of
Lonnie Sanders." According to the informant, Sanders would embark
carrying a green suitcase packed with marijuana. Sanders arrived as pre1. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). For other commentary on the Sandersdecision, see 11 RuTr.-CAM. L.
J. 169 (1979) and 14 VAL. L. REv. 157 (1979).
2. See notes 50-66 and accompanying text infra (explanation of the "automobile exception").
3. See notes 50-73 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 74-87 and accompanying text infra.
5. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,758 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. See note 38 infra.
7. See notes 39-49 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 50-66 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 67-73 and accompanying text infra.
10. For a definition of "reliability," see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1958).
11. 442 U.S. 753,755 (1979).
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dicted and was joined by a companion who placed Sanders' green suitcase in the trunk of a taxi. The taxi drove away carrying Sanders, his
companion, and the suitcase. 12
The officers followed the taxi and stopped it in traffic several blocks
from the airport. The driver opened the trunk at the officers' request.
With neither a warrant nor permission of the suspects, the officers opened
the unlocked suitcase and found 9.3 pounds of marijuana. 13 The officers
seized the suitcase and arrested Sanders and his companion. 14
Sanders was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 15 At a pre-trial hearing, Sanders' motion to suppress the marijuana
found in the suitcase was denied. 16 Sanders was tried and found guilty. 17
Finding the search of the suitcase unreasonable under the fourth amendment in light of United States v. Chadwick,18 the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed the conviction. 19 The United States Supreme Court affirmed.20
II.

REASONING OF THE SANDERS COURT

The Court framed the issue as whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched for contraband. 21 The Court distinguished searches under the "automobile
exception" 22 to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement 23 from war12.
13.

Id.
Id.

14. The Sanders opinion does not state whether Sanders was arrested before or after the search
of his suitcase. The State's brief conceded that the arrest took place after the search. Petitioner's Brief
On Writ of Certiorari To The Supreme Court of Arkansas at 3, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979).
15. 442 U.S. at 755. Sanders was indicted for a violation of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2617
(1976).
16. 442 U.S. at 756.
17.

Id.

18. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
19. 442 U.S. at 756. Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 559 S.W.2d 704 (1977).
20. 442 U.S. at 766.
21. Id. at 754. Given probable cause, police may lawfully stop and seach an automobile without
a warrant. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See notes 50-66 and accompanying text
infra.
22. See notes 50-66 and accompanying text infra.
23. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The fight of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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rantless searches of luggage and other personal property found inside automobiles. 24 The former are justified by the inherent mobility of automo25
biles which often makes obtaining a search warrant impracticable.
Moreover, there is a lessened expectation of privacy associated with an
automobile, because of its configuration, use and regulation. 26 But neither mobility nor a lessened expectation of privacy justifies the warrantless search of luggage. 27 Luggage loses its mobility once officers have it
securely within their control. 28 The mobility of the taxi did not attach to
Sanders' suitcase, because it came under the exclusive control of the police the moment they lifted it from the trunk. 29 Nor did the contact the
luggage had with the car lessen Sanders' expectation of privacy in the
suitcase. 30 Luggage is deemed to be a repository of personal effects, and
is inevitably associated with an expectation of privacy whether it be
placed in a car or stored in a closet. 31 Neither the suitcase's "fundamental
character as a repository for personal, private effects" 32 nor the expecta33
tion of privacy in it was altered by Sanders' failure to lock the suitcase.
The Court has interpreted the fourth amendment to require a warrant before any search may be
undertaken, subject to a few "jealously and carefully drawn [exceptions]." Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). For exceptions to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of an impounded vehicle); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1975) (hot pursuit); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,424 (1975) (consent);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches); United States v. ThirtySeven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (customs searches); Chimel v. California, 295 U.S. 752
(1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (emergency doctrine); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (plain view doctrine); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(automobile exception).
24. 442U.S.at761.
25. Id. The Court has long recognized a difference between the search of structures and readily
movable vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221
(1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694, 700-01 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). See also notes 60-66 and
accompanying text infra.
26. 442 U.S. at 761. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S.Ct. 421, 436 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.' 583, 590 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
441-42 (1973). Nevertheless, an individual operating a car does not lose all reasonable expectation
of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. As the
Court stated in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979): "Were the individual subject to
unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed."
27. 442 U.S. at 762.
28. Id. at 762-63.
29. Id. at 763-64.
30. Id. at 764-65.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 762-63 n.9.
33. Id. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court stated:
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The Court refused to justify the luggage search under the "automobile
exception" and declined an invitation to extend the doctrine of Chambers
v. Maroney34 to luggage. In Chambers, the Court upheld a warrantless
car search, concluding there was no constitutional difference between the
seizure of an automobile prior to the issuance of a warrant and an immediate warrantless search of the automobile. 35 Relying on Chambers, the
State argued in Sanders that if the police were entitled to seize the suitcase, they were entitled to search it. The Court disagreed, concluding that
because luggage is easily stored, a constitutional requirement that luggage be held until a warrant is obtained is far less burdensome on police
36
departments than would be a similar requirement for cars.
Since the Court found Sanders' expectation of privacy in his suitcase
undiminished by its location in the taxi, the warrantless search of the suitBy placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination. No less than one who locks
the doors of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this
manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendentment Warrant Clause.
Id. at 11. Although this dictum in Chadwick could be interpreted as requiring a suitcase or footlocker
to be locked before an expectation of privacy will be recognized by the Court, Sanders makes clear
that it is the objective expectation, not the subjective manifestation, of privacy that triggers the fourth
amendment's protection. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762 n.9.
34. 399 U.S. 42(1970).
35. Id. at 51-52. In Chambers the suspects matched the description of persons involved in a gas
station robbery that had just occurred. The police stopped the suspects' car in a darkened parking lot
and arrested them. Police found evidence linking the suspects to the robbery during the course of an
intensive search of the car at the police station. The search could not be justified under the search
incident to arrest doctrine because the search did not immediately follow the arrest. The evidence was
admitted at trial. In affirming the defendants' convictions, the Court observed:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of the
car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" instrusion
is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and
which the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a
variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to
search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. Some courts have viewed this language as justifying the warrantless search of luggage and other
containers found inside cars. See, e.g., United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 526-27 (3rd Cir.
1979); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1254 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v. Young, 567
F.2d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1079 (1978); United States v. Canada, 527
F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976); United States v. Hand, 516
F.2d 472, 475-76 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Tramunti,
513 F.2d 1087, 1104 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); United States v. Frick, 490
F.2d 666, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974); United States v. Evans, 481
F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Chapman, 474 F.2d 300, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1973).
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835 (1973). See also Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What ItisAnd What
It Is Not-A RationaleIn Search Of A ClearerLabel, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987, 1002-03 (1976).
36. 442 U.S. at 765 n. 14. One commentator finds it "difficult to believe" that there would be
serious burdens on police departments with respect to short-term seizure and detention of a car while
a search warrant is sought. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §7.2, at 541 n.96 (1978).
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case, in the absence of exigent circumstances, 37 violated the warrant re38
quirement of the fourth amendment.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND
The Right of Privacy

Although the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right of privacy, its broad principles and purposes have been found to create such a
right. 39 The guarantees of the fourth amendment come closest to an express recognition of a constitutionally protected right of personal privacy. 40
Early interpretations of the privacy right limited the scope of the fourth
amendment to certain "constitutionally protected areas" such as the
home and office. 4 1 The Supreme Court first recognized that the fourth
amendment's aegis extended to an individual's expectations of privacy in
Katz v. United States. 42 The Katz Court rejected traditional constitutional
37. See notes 50-66 and accompanying text infra (discussion of "exigent circumstances").
38. 442 U.S. at 765-66. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, concurring in Sanders, stated
that the relationship between the suitcase and the car was purely coincidental and therefore the case
did not call for an application of the "automobile exception." Id. at 766-67. The concurring justices
declined to state whether a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant to search a suitcase in a car
would be made if police had probable cause to believe contraband was located somewhere in the
vehicle, but did not know whether it was inside the suitcase or concealed in some part of the car's
structure. Id.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Justice Blackmun analogized
suitcases to cars and would have applied the Chambers doctrine to luggage. Justice Blackmun argued
that it would be inconsistent to allow the warrantless search of an automobile while forbidding the
search of any luggage found therein. Blackmun was persuaded that luggage, like an automobile, is
mobile. Furthermore, the expectation of privacy associated with a suitcase found in a car is probably
not significantly greater than the expectation of privacy in a locked glove compartment or trunk.
Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that it will be virtually impossible for courts to determine coherently which containers deserve the protection of the fourth amendment and which do not under the
"legitimate expectation of privacy" doctrine. Id. at 768-72. See notes 74-91 and accompanying text
infra.
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 662, 672
(1978). See generally Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). See
also THE EDERALIsTNo. 84 (A. Hamilton).
40. O'Brien, supra note 39, at 673. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937). See generally A. AMSTERDAM, PERSPECTIVES ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT (1974); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREMECOURT (1966).
41. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.139,
143-44 (1962); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). See generally. A. AMSTERDAM, supranote 40, at 356-59, 381.
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Note, A Reconsiderationof the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test,
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formulas that defined the fourth amendment's scope in terms of property
interests on the ground that the fourth amendment "protects people, not
places" 43 and protects "what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private.
Katz became the basis of a new formula for determining fourth
amendment coverage: "wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
'expectation of privacy,' . .. [that individual] is entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. "45
United States v. Chadwick,46 Sanders' forerunner, applied the Katz
doctrine to the question whether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open an arrested person's locked footlocker, lawfully
seized from the trunk of a parked car. 47 The Court found that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his footlocker. 48 Given the
lack of exigent circumstances, the warrantless search of the footlocker
49
violated the fourth amendment.
'44

76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 156 (1977); A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 40, at 382-83.
43. 389 U.S. at 351. In Katz, police eavesdropped on the defendant's conversation in a public
pay telephone booth by means of an electronic device attached to the outside of the booth. Katz
overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which held that telephone wiretapping
was not a "search" or "seizure" and was therefore outside the scope of the fourth amendment. 277
U.S. at 464-66. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 40, at 356-65. The Katz Court found that the
defendant had an expectation that his conversation while in the phone booth would remain private.
Since the Government's action violated the privacy upon which the defendant justifiably relied, the
electronic eavesdropping constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 389 U.S. at 353.
44. 389U.S.at351.
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Before Katz, the Court focused on the concept of a
"constitutionally protected area" to define the scope of the fourth amendment's protection of "persons, houses, papers and effects." E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1966). Katz focused
instead on the person, not the place, and concluded that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," while
"what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 389 U.S. at 351-52. The basic question whether the government has violated the
privacy upon which an individual justifiably relied remains the starting point for the determination of
fourth amendment coverage. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 40, at 357-58. Professor Amsterdam
believes the "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula destroys the spirit of Katz and most of its
substance. Id. at 383. He notes that the formula should not be construed to suggest that a particular
kind of government activity labeled an "intrusion" is necessary to trigger the fourth amendment. Nor
should the word "expectation" refer to an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, because "the
government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
half-hourly on televison that 1984 was being advanced . . . and that we were all forthwith being
placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." Id. at 384.
46. 433 U.S. I(1977).
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 11.
49. 433 U.S. at 15. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, suggested that if the federal agents had postponed the arrest until the car was in motion, "then the car could have been seized, taken to the
agents' office, and all its contents-including the footlocker-searched without a warrant." Id. at
22-23. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion predicted the Sanders analysis: "In my view, it is not at
all obvious that the agents could legally have searched the footlocker had they seized it after [the
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B.

The Automobile Exception

Although automobiles are within the scope of the fourth amendment,
they are exempt from the warrant requirement because of their mobility.
The "automobile exception" orginated in Carrollv. United States.50 The
Carroll Court held that probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains
evidence of crime coupled with the exigency of a car's mobility will justify a warrantless search. 5 1 Carrollhas been held to permit police intru52
sion into every part of a vehicle.
Chambers v. Maroney53 added a new dimension to the Carrollsearch:
where police safety requires, the search of the car may be postponed a
reasonable length of time and carried out at the police station without a
warrant. 54 As the Chambers Court noted, the car's mobility and the probable cause still exist at the station. 55 Since the practical effect of an immediate search without a warrant and immobilization until a warrant is ob56
tained is the same, either course is constitutional.
Although the facts of Carrolland Chamberspresented only the issue of
the warrantless search of cars, not containers within cars, lower courts
extended application of the principles enunciated in those cases. Probable
cause coupled with the exigency of mobility were often found sufficient
to justify the warrantless search of luggage and other containers found in
57
cars properly stopped and searched under the "automobile exception.''
Since the Supreme Court had already declared the warrantless search of a
defendants] had driven away with it in their car ....
"Id. at 16-17. "While the contents of the car
could have been searched pursuant to the automobile exception, it is by no means clear that the
contents of locked containers found inside a car are subject to search under this exception, any more
than they would be if the police found them in any other place." Id. at 17 n. 1.
50. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll,federal agents fortuitously came across a vehicle driven by
suspected rum-runners. An immediate search of their automobile revealed 68 bottles of liquor hidden
behind the upholstery of the seats.
51. ld.at160-62.
52. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (glove compartment); Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 364 (1975) (passenger compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (trunk);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (concealed compartment under dashboard). The facts of
Carrolldid not demand resolution of the issue whether the warrantless search of a container found in
a properly searched automobile would be constitutional.
53. 399 U.S. 42(1970).
54. Id. at 51-52.
55. Id. If the fourth amendment permitted the seizure and immobilization of an automobile until
a warrant could be obtained, the mobility might not exist at the police station. In that event, the
Chambers analysis would rest on a faulty premise.
56. 399 U.S. at 51-52.
57. See e.g., United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Giles,
536 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 867 (1976); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 832 (1975).
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car's trunk, 58 glove compartment, 59 and upholstery 6° constitutional, it
seemed logical to courts to extend the "automobile exception" to include
61
containers found inside the automobile.
The Chadwick Court, however, refused to extend the rationale of
Chambers to justify the warrantless search of the defendant's footlocker.
The Court found Chambers inapplicable because a footlocker has neither
the mobility nor the lessened expectation of privacy associated with
cars. 62 Some courts interpreted Chadwick to mean that the Supreme Court
would not create a new warrant exemption for luggage, but continued to
allow the warrantless search of luggage found in a car under the "automobile exception.' '63 Others recognized that Chadwick mandated a reappraisal of the boundaries of the "automobile exception.' 64
The Sanders Court attempted to clarify the principles enunciated in
Chadwick, and emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are
based upon societal needs that outweigh the individual's right of privacy. 65 Because no sufficiently compelling societal need would be served
by allowing such a serious intrusion into Sanders' fourth amendment right
of privacy, the automobile exception did not justify a warrantless search
66
beyond the taxi and its component parts.
C.

Exigent Circumstances

Although the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for the use of
warrants whenever feasible, 67 emergency situations have traditionally
58. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
59. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
60. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir. 1979). See also United States
v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1977), wherein the court stated:
Were we to rule that Chadwick applies here and renders the search of the suitcase illegal,
inconsistent and contradictory results would follow. For instance, a police officer could seach
and seize a brick of marijuana lying inside the trunk of a car but not a brick of marijuana lying
inside a suitcase in the trunk of a car.
62. 433 U.S. 1, 15-16(1977).
63. See United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1254 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v. Gaultney,
581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1977).
64. See United States v. Vickers, 599 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnson, 588
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ester, 442 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Note, United States v. Chadwickand The Lesser
Intrusion Concept: The Unreasonablenessof Being Reasonable, 58 B.U.L. REV. 436 (1978); Comment, 24 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 481 (1978).
65. 442U.S. at758-60.
66. Id. at 762. Once the police had seized Sanders' suitcase and had taken Sanders and his companion into custody, there was no remaining societal need to justify a further invasion of Sanders'
privacy. The police then had ample time to present the issue of probable cause to a magistrate before
searching the suitcase.
67. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong
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given rise to warrant exceptions. 68 The Court has recognized a wide variety of circumstances as "exigent. '"69 The Chadwick Court defined exigent circumstances in luggage search cases as the danger that the suspect
"might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence. "70 Exigent circumstances are to be determined after police have
seized the object to be searched and have it securely within their control. 7 1 Thus, while mobility and a lessened expectation of privacy in an
automobile justify its search, 72 neither mobility nor the possibility that the
suspect will obtain a weapon or destroy evidence justifies the search of a
container or package once police have it securely within their control.
Because the police obtained exclusive control over Sanders' suitcase,
73
there was no remaining exigency to justify its search.
Sanders, like Chadwick, narrows the definition of exigent circumstances to instances in which the preservation of evidence or the safety of
the police and public require that a suspect's container be searched without a warrant.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE SANDERS DECISION

Sanders inescapably required resolution of the conflict Chadwick
avoided between the "automobile exception" and the search of luggage
found inside automobiles. 74 Although the Sanders Court correctly concluded that the "automobile exception" did not justify the search of Sanders' suitcase, the decision would have been more meaningful for the poSun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,479-482 (1963).
68. See, e.g., Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23,39-40 (1962).
69. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (destruction of evidence). The Court has also upheld the warrantless search of an automobile based upon its
mobility even though the police were holding the defendant and his car keys at the time of the search.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). See also Note, MisstatingThe Exigency Rule: The Supreme
Court v. The Exigency Requirement in WarrantlessAutomobile Searches, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 981
(1977).
70. 433 U.S. at 15.
71. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,763 (1979).
72. This principle is inherent in the automobile exception. See notes 50-66 and accompanying
text supra.
73. In Sanders there was no indication that the police believed Sanders or his companion were
carrying weapons or explosives in the suitcase. Once the police lifted it from the trunk, the danger of
destruction of evidence ceased.
74. Because the footlocker in Chadwick had been placed in the trunk of a parked car only minutes before the federal agents seized it, the government declined to argue the validity of the search
under the "automobile exception," claiming instead that the footlocker should be analogized to an
automobile to create a new "baggage exception" based upon mobility. Consequently, the Chadwick
Court did not resolve the issue whether luggage found in a car could lawfully be searched under the
"automobile exception."
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lice, the public, and the courts if it had presented workable guidelines to
assist in the determination whether a legitimate expectation of privacy
exists in containers other than luggage.
The Court was correct in its distinction between luggage and automobiles because luggage possesses none of the characterisitics of automobiles that justify their warrantless search. Its function is not transportation, and its contents are usually not in plain view. Nor is luggage subject
to registration, licensing, or routine official inspection. 75 Thus, while
both automobiles and luggage are within the scope of the fourth amendment, a person's expectation of privacy in luggage is substantially greater
than in an automobile. This greater expectation of privacy requires adherence to the warrant clause regardless of where the luggage to be searched
76
is found.
Nevertheless, as Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent from the majority opinion in Sanders,77 the subjective expectation of privacy associated with a suitcase and a glove compartment or trunk may be virtually
the same. Although Blackmun was persuaded that the incongruity in the
majority's promulgation of a different policy on warrantless search for
areas associated with a similar privacy expectation rendered the Sanders
opinion illogical, the distinction between the search of luggage and the
search of a glove compartment or trunk is not based upon a supposed
difference in the privacy expectation associated with each area. Because a
glove compartment is an integral part of the automobile, police cannot
obtain exclusive control over it as they can over a suitcase. If the automobile cannot be detained while a warrant is sought, the opportunity to
search the car, the glove compartment, and the trunk is fleeting and therefore exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search exist. Thus, the
exigency of mobility overrides the expectation of privacy in a glove compartment or trunk, even though that expectation may be equal to the expectation of privacy in a suitcase found in the same car. Although the
impracticality of requiring a warrant for the search of a glove compartment or trunk precludes those areas from receiving the full protection of
the fourth amendment, their exception from the warrant requirement does
75. Luggage is subject to inspection upon border entry or common carrier travel, however. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.12 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13
(1977).
76. Presumably doctrines such as search incident to arrest and exigent circumstances could justify the warrantless search of luggage, whether or not the luggage was found in a car. Thus, if a
suspect has access to the luggage and police have probable cause to believe it contains weapons or
destructable evidence, an exigency exists to justify the warrantless search of the luggage. Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n. 11 (1979). See note 23 supra for a list of exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
77. 442U.S.at769.
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not demand a similar policy for the search of luggage. The fourth amendment guarantee of privacy should be fully implemented within the bounds
of legitimate societal law enforcement concerns. In the absence of a compelling societal requirement for a warrantless search, logic should not be
invoked to prohibit the protection of one private area simply because all
similar areas cannot pragmatically be protected.
Although Sanders dealt only with the search of a suitcase, the Court
noted somewhat crypticaly that "[n]ot all containers and packages found
by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of
the Fourth Amendment.' '78 Thus, while all containers and packages are
presumably within the scope 79 of the fourth amendment, the content 80 of
the amendment may vary with the type of container. Some containers
may not be protected by the warrant requirement at all. 81 Although the
Court did not specify the formula for determining which containers deserve the full protection of the fourth amendment, the Court stated that
some containers by their very nature cannot support a legitimate expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance. 82 The contents of such containers are, in effect, in "plain
view," and thereby subject to lawful seizure. 83 But the Court's observation that a container holding contraband in "plain view" will not deserve
the full protection of the fourth amendment merely restates a traditional
exception and does little to clarify the scope of Sanders' prospective application. 84
The Sanders Court admitted that there will be "difficulties" in determining which parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search. 85 This suggests that the Court contemplated something more than
78. Id. at 764 n.13.
79. For the definition of the fourth amendment's "scope," see note 81 infra.
80. For the definition of the fourth amendment's "content," see note 81 infra.
81. See note 23 supra (text of fourth amendment). The words "searches and seizures" and the
words "persons, houses, papers and effects" limit the scope of the fourth amendment. Thus, if the
governmental intrusion is not a "search" or "seizure" of "persons, houses, papers [or] effects," the
fourth amendment does not require it to be reasonable. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 40, at 356-57.
Once the governmental intrusion is determined to be a search or seizure, the fourth amendment's
content may or may not require a search warrant.
82. 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13. The Court identified burglar tool kits and gun cases as examples of
such items.
83. Because a search is not conducted when officers look at what is in plain view, Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam), a container that constructively places its contents in "plain view" by its outward shape, such as a gun case, may also be seized without a warrant.
84. Furthermore, if Sanders means that all containers and packages deserve the full protection of
the fourth amendment unless their contents are in "plain view," then dissenting Justice Blackmun's
criticism of the legitimate expectation of privacy rule is unfounded, because the "plain view" doctrine is easily applied to a wide variety of containers. See note 38 supra (Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion).
85. 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13.
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a simple application of the "plain view" doctrine 86 to parcels taken from
an automobile during a lawful warrantless search. 87 If the Court anticipates some gradation of the privacy interest in various containers and
packages, then specific guidelines for determining the level of the privacy
interest and the corresponding content of the fourth amendment are in
order.
V.

PROPOSAL

An expectation of privacy in a container which triggers the warrant
clause should be one that is recognized as legitimate by society as determined by an objective standard. This determination should include an analysis of the extent the container is commonly used as a repository for personal effects. 88 The transparency or opacity of the container should also
be considered, 89 because there can be no expectation of privacy in objects
stored in "plain view." The permanence of the container should be relevant to the privacy expectation, since protection of the contents would be
a major purpose of the container. 90 The individual's manifestation of a
subjective expectation of privacy in the container could enhance or detract from the initial determination of the privacy expectation in close
cases. If the fourth amendment guarantee of privacy is to be taken seriously, however, the contents of the container should be irrelevant to the
privacy expectation in order to prevent the fourth amendment from becoming a tool for the implementation of government policy. 9 1 Such an
86. An application of the plain view doctrine is unlikely to cause any "difficulties."
87. One court has interpreted Sanders to require only an application of the plain view doctrine
and not any "gradations of privacy interests" scheme. United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1045
(2d Cir. 1979).
88. The Sanders Court identified luggage as a common repository of personal effects, a factor
supporting the Court's conclusion that luggage deserves the protection of the warrant clause. 442
U.S. at 762. In contrast, plastic and burlap bags of the type "customarily used to haul marijuana"
will not support a legitimate expectation of privacy. United States v. Stevie, 578 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.
1977), modified, 582 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979).
89. If the container is transparent, it should be subject to warrantless search under the "plain
view" doctrine. Furthermore, if the appearance of the container makes known its contents, it will be
subject to search under Sanders. See note 83 supra.
90. Professor LaFave suggests that the expectation of privacy in containers like paper bags found
in cars exists not so much because of the bag itself, but because of the protection the bag receives
from the structure of the car. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 36, §7.2 at 542-43 (1978).
91. As Justice Frankfurter stated:
It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties
when involved on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by such
disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly
in the end.
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (dissenting opinion). But see United States v.
Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir. 1978) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911
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approach should help to establish specific criteria for the determination of
the privacy expectation in a container, while preserving the flexibility
needed for case-by-case resolution of fourth amendment questions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Sanders is an attempt by the Court to reaffirm the validity of the presumptive warrant requirement. In its resolution of the conflict between
the Katz doctrine and the "automobile exception," the Court has placed
severe limits on the extent to which the "automobile exception" will justify the warrantless search of containers found within cars. Nevertheless,
the existence of exigent circumstances, such as the threat of destruction of
evidence or harm to police officers or the public, may justify the warrantless search of luggage found in an automobile, although the exigency will
usually disappear once police have the container within their exclusive
control. Proper application of Sanders will be difficult, however, since
the Court did not clarify the criteria for determining the expectation of
privacy in a container. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, Sanders is a significant step toward a revitalization of the fourth amendment right of privacy.

Suzanne Oliver

(1979) ("[HI]ow much 'legitimate' expectation of privacy should a person be permitted to enjoy in the
concealment and transportation of contraband?").
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